The study examines if recent reforms in taxation and labor regulations in several transition and developing countries contributed to the observed decline in tax evasion. It uses the Business Environment and Economic Performance Survey, a unified firm survey in 33 countries conducted in 1999-2005. The paper finds a strong positive and statistically significant effect of various measures of taxation and regulation on sales underreporting.
Introduction
High taxes and excessive regulation, especially of labor as the most costly input, are two very common explanations of tax evasion. Recently many countries implemented major tax and labor reforms to improve efficiency and combat widespread tax evasion. Previous studies of tax evasion are often confined to one country or to a cross-section of countries, and thus cannot estimate the effect of these policy changes across various institutional environments over time (see Andreoni et al., 1998 and Schneider and Enste, 2000 for the review of literature). This paper exploits not only within-country variation but also cross-country and inter-temporal variation to test the effect of tax rates and labor regulation on evasion. It uses the Business Environment and Economic Performance Survey (BEEPS), a unified firm survey in 33 countries conducted in [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Of these countries, 27 are low and middle income countries (LMIC), mostly former socialist countries from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and 6 are developed countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, and Spain).
1 The LMIC group is particularly interesting as many of these countries carried out major reforms of their tax and regulatory systems during the same period.
Measure of Tax Evasion
Tax evasion is difficult to quantify, especially in the absence of integral audit programs of randomly selected taxpayers, which most of the surveyed countries lack. It is also very unlikely that managers will reveal their true tax evasion activities in response to a direct question. The BEEPS get around these difficulties by asking managers an indirect question; we examine if recent reforms in taxation and labor regulations in many transition economies contributed to this sizeable decline in tax evasion.
Measures of Taxation and Labor Regulation
The measures of corporate taxation and labor regulation are drawn directly from BEEPS as well as from several external sources. The internal BEEPS measures include mostly managers' perceptions on whether tax rates, tax administration, or labor regulation represent an obstacle for doing business. Firm managers were asked "how problematic are these different 2 The numbers from the 1999 survey should be interpreted cautiously because the answers were given within 8 categories as opposed to one number in other years.
factors for the operation and growth of your business," on the scale from 1 to 4 (1=no obstacle).
The BEEPS also asks managers about the share of excess employment due to various government restrictions, 3 which could be an excellent proxy for the costs of labor regulation.
Since government restrictions can result in both over-employment and under-employment, the employment costs of labor regulation are measured as an absolute percentage deviation of the current employment from the optimal level of employment that would be achieved in the absence of labor regulation. Over time, fewer and fewer managers considered high taxes and tax regulation as obstacles for doing business. The average scores of these factors in LMIC are steadily approaching the scores in high income countries. However, the trends in labor regulation are less clear. The managerial assessment score for labor regulation as an obstacle for doing business was first declining and then increasing in LMIC, reaching the average score in high income countries. Yet, the employment costs of labor regulation remain higher than the costs in developed economies. Table 2 The estimates strongly indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of corporate income taxes on tax evasion. A similar positive effect is found with respect to other objective and subjective measures of taxation and labor regulation, as shown in Table 3 (with the exception of VAT in two specifications and PIT in one specification). Interestingly, the transition countries that adopted the flat rate PIT experienced a significant decline in tax evasion after the tax reform.
Findings
Thus, our empirical analysis provides strong evidence of a positive relationship between tax evasion, on one hand, and tax rates and labor regulation, on the other hand. The costs of labor regulation hardly vary over time and, therefore, cannot explain a recent considerable decline in tax evasion in many transition economies. At the same time, lower and less progressive tax rates introduced in most of these countries can potentially explain some of the recent decline in underreporting of sales in the formal sector. Yet, a significant share of the decline remains unexplained, which leaves room for other potential factors to be examined in the future.
7 Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each specification also includes industry and year dummies, country's GDP growth rate and 3-year average annual inflation rate. LPM=linear probability model. Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reported are the estimated coefficients on alternative regulation measures in tax evasion functions. All specifications include the same set of variables as in Table 2 .
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